Introduction
The HB-Line Scrap Recovery process has a mission to dissolve "scrap" material, uranium and plutonium oxide, in nitric acid. The resulting solution is then transferred to H-Canyon for further processing. HB-Line has a dual train dissolving system. One train consists of a dissolver and a Product Hold Tank . Each dissolver is a slab tank with a 30-liter capacity. The dissolution process consists of adding 15 liters of 12 molar nitric acid with a small addition of fluoride to act as a catalyst for the reaction. When combined with about one liter of heel, this results in a total dissolver volume of 16 liters. The material is introduced and the solution is heated. Once dissolution is complete, the cooled solution is transferred to RT-33/34 and transferred to H-Canyon.
On 5/29/03 at approximately 0450 hours HB-Line personnel charged an authorized uranium-aluminum oxide batch of 1457 grams to the RD-13 dissolver. The batch contained approximately 52 % aluminum and 6 % uranium. The batch was the first batch charged from a category of material defined as "Desicooler" material. Desicooler material is a mixture of 1970s uranium-aluminum scrap from a U 3 O 8 Shortly after the charge was complete, 0456hrs, operators began to see rises in the liquid level and temperature. At approximately 0500 hrs yellow "smoke" was reported to be in the adjacent glove boxes. Operations responded by notifying Fire Department personnel to report to the facility. The yellow "smoke" was nitrogen oxide fumes. The "smoke" dissipated within 5 minutes. No mitigating actions were needed by Fire Department or Operations personnel to clear the "smoke".
The total rise in temperature in the dissolver liquid was approximately 82 degrees centigrade due to the reaction. The rate of rise in temperature was about 7 degrees centigrade per minute in the dissolver liquid until the material reached boiling of 111 degrees centigrade. The reaction then continued boiling for about 3 minutes and 40 seconds. Immediately after boiling stops the liquid began to cool. Within seven minutes, the liquid quickly dropped from a max of 111 degrees to 80 degrees centigrade. The material then continued to cool to ambient temperatures at a slower rate.
Inspection by operators shortly after the reported reaction revealed liquid on the floor of adjacent glove boxes. About 7 liters was lost from the dissolver during the event. The estimated liquid on the glovebox floor based on visual observation was estimated to be about 3-4 liters. An additional 1-1.5 liters was seen in the Vessel Vent Catch Tank (VVCT). The remaining solution evaporated during the event and collected in the Scrubbers or evaporated into the glovebox and was removed with the nitrogen oxide fumes. All processing was halted until reviews of the reaction were completed by WSRC management and engineering.
A narrative of the time line of the event is attached in Appendix A to this report. The dissolver temperature trace during the event is shown in Appendix B.
Analysis of Event
The source of heat that caused the dissolver to elevate in temperature was the reaction of the scrap constituents with nitric acid. The principal constituent that would cause a temperature increase is aluminum. Laboratory analysis showed that the can containing 1188.7 grams was 52% aluminum, and 6% uranium. Both of these materials undergo exothermic reactions with nitric acid. This can contained the highest concentration of aluminum in analyzed cans that were authorized to be processed under existing controls (2000 gram charge).
The reactions of aluminum with nitric acid depend on the acid concentration during the reaction. These reactions are shown in Appendix C, and are summarized below.
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• Al + 6HNO 3 → Al(NO 3 ) 3 + 3NO 2 + 3H 2 O Equation 1
• Al + 4HNO 3 → Al(NO 3 ) 3 + NO + 2H 2 O Equation 2
• 8Al + 30HNO 3 → 8AL(NO) 3 + 3N 2 O + 15H 2 O Equation 3
• 10Al + 36HNO 3 → 10Al(NO 3 ) 3 + 3N 2 + 18H 2 O Equation 4
• 2Al + 6HNO 3 → 2Al(NO 3 ) 3 + 3H 2 Equation 5 The first reaction is favored at high (generally > 7M) nitric acid concentration, and the last reaction is favored at low (generally less than 1M) nitric acid concentration. Note that all these reactions are with aluminum metal. The energies associated with these reactions are shown in Appendix D. The maximum volume of gas formed is from reaction 1, with three moles of NO 2 formed for each mole of aluminum dissolved.
Also shown in Appendix D are the energies associated with creation of hydrated aluminum nitrate. These energies are all less than the energies associated with the nonhydrated aluminum nitrate.
Further, Appendix D shows the energy associated with uranium metal dissolution. The energy released and gas generation are much less, on a per gram basis, than the energy liberation and gas generation for aluminum.
The dissolver contained about 16 liters of 12M nitric acid. The dissolver weighs about 250 pounds and is constructed from 304L stainless steel (Reference 2). The amount of energy necessary to raise the temperature of the dissolver system under adiabatic conditions can be calculated by knowing the contents of the dissolver, the mass of the dissolver, and the material of construction of the dissolver. The pertinent information is from Reference 3:
Heat capacity of 304L SS: 0.12 cal/gram °C Heat capacity of 12M nitric acid: 0.65 cal/gram -°C Density of 12M nitric acid: 1.33 grams/cc
The dissolvers are slab tanks suspended in wing cabinets. To determine the rates of the chemical reactions, the amount of energy needed to raise the temperature of the system at the rate shown in Appendix B was calculated. The reaction needed to add heat to raise the system temperature and to also make up for heat losses. The heat losses to the atmosphere were calculated, using the methods from Reference 4. The equations used, and the results for forced convection at 10 meters/second, are shown in Appendix F. The assumed flow rate of 10 meters/second is conservative, but was chosen to achieve a conservative result. The maximum heat transfer rate was 28.67 Kcal/minute. The heat losses were also estimated from the cooldown portion of the curve shown in Appendix B. Much larger heat loss rates were obtained from the cooldown curve than from the theoretical calculation, as discussed below. The maximum heat transfer rate from the cooldown curve is 201 Kcal/minute. Using a theoretical analysis without the benefit of knowing the exact conditions can cause large uncertainties in the calculated heat loss. Conduction to the heater was suspected to contribute to the differences seen. However, the area of actual contact with the heater is limited (the heater transfers energy principally by radiant heat). Because of the level of knowledge with respect to heat transfer impacting factors, and to be conservative with respect to gas generation, the heat loss rates were calculated empirically based on the higher heat loss rates obtained from the cooldown curve.
The heat loss was calculated for the approximately 10 °C intervals where the system was cooling down. The first interval started after the solution temperature had peaked and then fallen to 107.65 °C, and extended to a temperature of 99.54 °C. The rate of heat loss was faster in the second interval than in the first. This behavior suggests the reaction did not terminate immediately, but continued at a reduced rate for a few minutes. Using the higher heat loss rate is conservative for the calculation of gas generation rate because it indicates that the rate of reaction was faster. This in turn means that more Aluminum was reacted. The remaining intervals are about 10°C down to 59.89 °C. Below 59.89 °C, the heat losses are assumed to be negligible.
The heat loss rates are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Analysis of Temperature Rise During Event
The temperature trace of the dissolver during the event showed a rapid rise in temperature shortly after the material was added to the dissolver. The following analysis will show that the quantity of aluminum in the charge was more than sufficient to generate the temperature rise that was observed and prove that aluminum was the most likely cause of the temperature rise.
The amount of aluminum in Can MC02-181A was about 52%, and the mass charged from that can was about 1188 grams. The resulting aluminum content was 617 grams. The aluminum dissolution reactions are shown as Equations 1 through 5, and also in Appendix C. Uranium dissolution is also exothermic, but it generates significantly less heat per gram than does aluminum, and its contribution is conservatively ignored to demonstrate that the heatup can be explained by dissolution of aluminum alone.
The reaction of aluminum with nitric acid that produces three moles of NO 2 ( Equation 1) is the predominant reaction at high nitric acid concentrations. The NO 2 evolved matches the observations of the color of gas reported by the operators in the glovebox, and it generates the minimum amount of heat of the reactions that predominate in the high nitric acid regime. The heat of this reaction is slightly higher when non-hydrated aluminum nitrate is assumed for the reaction product, so the hydrated version of the reaction is chosen for this analysis. The heat of reaction for dissolving aluminum oxide is significantly lower, but no gas is liberated when aluminum oxide is dissolved.
Heat is absorbed by the dissolver itself and by the dissolver solution as heat is generated by the dissolution reaction. The parameters that govern the amount of heat required to raise the temperature are summarized below:
• Nitric acid: Specific Gravity = 1.33 grams/cc, specific heat = 0.64 calories/gram -°C , volume = 16.1.1 liters
• Dissolver: Material is 304L SS, weight (empty) = 250 pounds, specific heat = 0.12 cal/gram -°C The analysis presented above proves that aluminum is the most probable cause of the temperature rise in the dissolver. The amount of energy that could be generated by the dissolution of aluminum explains the rise in temperature that was seen during the event.
Analysis of RD-13 Pressure Trace During Event
The instrument used for vacuum reading in RD-13 is a Foxboro 823DP Pressure Transmitter with a range of 0-30 in WC calibrated in a range for of 0 to 15 in WC.
The graph of the RD-13 pressure instrument output during the exothermic reaction is included in Appendix E. The time scale has been changed to reflect a 67 minute 30 second correction factor. The actual time of the recorder instrument raw data was found to be ahead of Daylight Savings Time by 67 minutes 30 seconds.
Appendix G, Figure 1 Appendix B illustrates the increase in temperature of RD-13 during the reaction. The graph indicates the initial charge of the material at 0450 hrs and the immediate ramp up in temperature. The beginning temperature was ambient temperature (28.5 degrees centigrade). The high level alarm for RD-13 was received at 0456 hours. The High Level alarm is marked on attachment 2 at a corresponding temperature in the dissolver of 68.82 degrees centigrade. The first report of gas in the glove box was reported at 0500 hrs, which corresponds, to a temp of 100.0 degrees centigrade.
An evaluation of the RD-13 pressure fluctuations was performed by Systems Engineering and the conclusion is that RD-13 pressure instrument readings were a were a result of localized pressure transients inside the instrument sensing line for the RD-13 pressure instrument. The localized pressure transients were a result of foam/bubbles rising in the vessel vent system piping and entering the sensing line. The basis of the conclusion is based on the following: A test of was performed using RD-14 while RD-14 dissolver vessel was in DEINVENTORY MODE. RD-14 charge chute was partially blocked with the charge beaker. The resulting blockage was to simulate a blocked vent path for RD-14 and see the trend for RD-13 corresponding pressure trace. The test was performed using calibrated RD-13 and RD-14 pressure instrumentation. The purpose of the test was to document what the system response would when a dissolver charge chute was blocked and unblocked. The result is an almost instantaneous response on RD-13 vacuum readings on initial blockage and unblockage. If the RD-13 pressure recording on Appendix E is real, then an expected corresponding system pressure spike would have been observed on the RD-14 pressure recording. That effect was not recorded during the 5/29/03 exothermic reaction. What was recorded was a slight increase in vacuum pressure normally observed during normal dissolution boiling temperatures.
On 5/27/03 a normal pressure curve (both charge chutes removed) was recorded for RD-13 and RD-13. RD-14 was brought to boiling using heat was generated using the dissolver heater block. The heatup was for post maintenance testing of RD-14 dissolver after replacement of the dissolver unit. The graph indicates a similar increase of RD-13 vacuum pressure as observed in RD-14 during the RD-13 5/29/03 exothermic reaction. This can be explained by higher vapor pressures observed in the on-line condenser reducing vacuum slightly on the on-line dissolver and increasing vacuum slightly on the off-line dissolver. The same trace is observed in RD-14 during RD-13 rapid rise in temperature and boiling on 5/29/03.
2.
It is known from past events that foam/bubbles produces higher differential pressure indications in differential pressure instruments. H-Area Outside Facilities has experienced similar incidents in the GP evaporator. Essentially the foam in the GP evaporator caused higher differential pressure readings and subsequently shutdown the evaporator unexpectedly (Reference 8).
3.
The calibration of the RD-13 vacuum instrumentation after the exothermic reaction found the as-found condition out-of-calibration. The resulting magnitude of the out-of-calibration discrepancy would have shifted the vacuum readings by 0.9 in WC (more negative) if the correction for the calibration was applied during the transient.
Analysis of Available Purge During the Event
The bases of the HB-Line JCO for Alternate Hydrogen Control assume that 20 cfm of purge air is available for dilution of hydrogen. Based on analysis of existing data
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The temperature data from the event was used to calculate bounding gas generation rates. The amount of heat that needed to be added to the solution to raise the temperature accordingly, plus the heat that needed to be added to the solution to replace ambient heat losses was determined. The reaction that provides the largest gas generation rate for the lowest amount of heat generated is the hydrated reaction that produces three moles of NO 2 , per Appendix D. This reaction produces 7.28 Kcal of energy per mole of aluminum metal reacted. This is the principal reaction expected at the high nitric acid concentrations before the concentration in the dissolver is depleted.
As discussed earlier, the heat losses during the reaction were evaluated from the cooldown curve. These are added to the heat inputs needed to raise the system temperature. The reaction that generates three moles of gas per mole of aluminum dissolved was conservatively chosen to be used in this evaluation. The applicable glovebox exhaust fan continued to operate as normal during this event.
The actual flow through the charge chute with a glovebox exhaust fan operating has been tested and shown to be 30 cfm at 72 °F and one atmosphere. The credit taken in the JCO for hydrogen calculations is 20 cfm. If the reaction was creating a peak of about 7 cfm of gas, the actual flow could be lowered to 23 cfm. This is still higher than the 20 cfm credited in the JCO. Additionally, the 30 cfm was measured with the scrubber off. Per Reference 5, the vacuum at the outlet of the vessel vent catch tank (53PG) is 9.0 inches vacuum with both the glovebox exhaust fan and the scrubber operating, and 6.5 inches vacuum with the scrubber not operating. The scrubber was operating during this event. This provides additional flow not credited in the 30 cfm at one atmosphere and 72 °F credited.
Analysis of Worst Case Analysis of Gas Generation Rate During Event
Since nitrogen oxide fumes were observed in the charge chute glovebox, it was postulated that enough gas was generated to overcome the 20 cfm of purge that is required by the bases of the HB-Line JCO. The following analysis shows that the worst case chemistry (with respect to total gas generation) could not overcome the 20 cfm of purge.
The aluminum consumed during system heatup and the gas generation rate associated with this phase of the reaction is discussed in Section 3.5. This phase of the reaction consumed at least 403 grams of aluminum, based on the reaction that gives the lowest heat generation rate per mole of aluminum dissolved. This reaction is shown in Equation  1 . This reaction also gives the highest gas generation rate per mole of aluminum dissolved.
In Section 3.5, the analysis was terminated after the temperature reached 107.65 °C, per Appendix B. The reaction continued at temperatures above this for an additional 10.66 minutes before falling to 107.45 °C. It is reasonable to assume the reaction was occurring at the rate for the interval from about 100 °C to 107.65 °C. The temperature does not rise much during this time because boiling is occurring, and the condenser is returning subcooled water to the dissolver. The latent heat of vaporization far exceeds the sensible heat required to increase the temperature of nitric acid-water mixtures. reactions chosen require more aluminum and uranium than is in the material charged to generate those rates. Therefore, the gas generation rates shown in Table 2 are conservative with respect to the amount of aluminum and uranium in the material charged.
The 7.2 cfm of gas shown in Table 2 would not be sufficient to overcome the 20 cfm that was available for purge. In addition, this peak gas generation rate still falls within the uncertainty allowed by the JCO. The 30 cfm was actually measured during the HB-Line flow test as described in Reference 13. Therefore, more than 20 cfm was still available for purge. This analysis discounts the increased flow provided by the scrubbers as described in Section 3.3. 200241588. An aliquot of the sample was dissolved in nitric acid in the laboratory, and was held for 30 minutes at room temperature prior to heatup. The sample was then heated to boiling. Every 10 minutes, the amount of gas collected was logged on lab data sheets. If 5 ml of gas sample was available, a sample was drawn to analyze the hydrogen content.
Analysis of Hydrogen Concentration During Event
The concentration of hydrogen in the gases measured increased as the reaction progressed in the lab. The nitric acid concentration will diminish from reactions of the nitric acid with aluminum to produce aluminum nitrate [Al(NO 3 ) 3 ] and nitrogen oxides. The data from the 10-minute period with maximum hydrogen production was selected for evaluation. The data is: -Total gas generated: 5 ml in 10-minute period -Hydrogen concentration in gas: 3.28% -Weight of sample analyzed: 0.7548 grams
The amount of gas generated must be multiplied by a scaleup factor to account for hydrogen generation in the dissolver. This scaleup factor is (1188.7/0.7548) ~ 1575. Therefore, the gas generated in the dissolver scales to (1575*5ml/10 minutes) ~ 788 ml/minute. The gas volume is measured at lab conditions of 25 °C (298 °K) and one atmosphere.
The rapid reaction rate in the dissolver was not expected. To account for a higher reaction rate, the scaled-up gas production rate was multiplied by a factor of 10. Based on engineering judgement, this factor is expected to suitably bound the situation. The total gas production rate conservatively assigned to the dissolver, for this evaluation, is thus (788*10) = 7,880 ml/minute.
The measured hydrogen concentration was 3.28%. To account for any differences between the actual acid used in HB-Line and in the laboratory, the concentration of hydrogen measured in the laboratory is conservatively doubled to account for this potential effect. Based on engineering judgement, applying this factor suitably bounds the differences in acid concentration. Therefore, the maximum rate of hydrogen generation assigned from conservative use of laboratory data is (7,880*0.0328*2) ~ 517 ml/minute.
Bounding values were calculated for Can MC02-201A, by statistically projecting the analyzed results from 15 analyzed cans from that statistical population. This is documented in N-CLC-H-00509, Rev. 0. The hydrogen concentration from the 10-minute interval that contained the maximum hydrogen concentration from each run was entered into a statistical database, and projections were made for bounding hydrogen generation rates in dissolver charges including mixed scrap cans that had not been analyzed. The total gas generation rate in ml/minute from the maximum gas generation rate in any 10-minute interval, regardless of hydrogen concentration, was also projected. These projections were made for a 95% confidence level. An unanalyzed population of 20 dissolver batches was conservatively chosen for establishing controls; the actual number of dissolver batches containing unanalyzed cans is seven, including the charge already made. The projected bounding values, at the 95% confidence level, are listed below. Values from Appendix F of N-CLC-H-00509 have been divided by 2000 to back out the scaleup factor used in the projection. • Maximum total gas generation rate, regardless of hydrogen concentration associated with the gas, is chosen.
• 95% confidence level chosen for projection • Projection based on 20 dissolver charges containing unanalyzed cans, rather than seven charges planned.
Additionally, the rate of generation was assumed to double, and the concentration of hydrogen in the gas was also assumed to double, for evaluation of the second can. This gives an effective hydrogen concentration for evaluation of ~66%. This is almost double the concentration of any can analyzed in the entire Desicooler characterization program. This accounts for potential differences in the reaction rate in the dissolver as compared to the laboratory apparatus. The total hydrogen generation rate from material from Can MC02-201A is thus (2*2*612) ~ 2448 ml/minute.
The total hydrogen generation rate is the sum of the contribution from each can charged, or 517 + 2448 ml/minute, or 2965 ml/minute. This is evaluated at laboratory conditions of one atmosphere and 25 °C. The purge flow was measured at one atmosphere and 72°F (22.2 °C). Correcting the gas generation rate to bring it to the purge conditions, the gas generation rate is ((295.2/298)*2965) ~ 2937 ml/minute. This is converted to cubic feet per minute, by dividing by 28,316 ml/cubic feet. The resulting hydrogen generation rate is 0.104 cubic feet/minute.
The credited dilution flow is 20 cubic feet/minute. The hydrogen concentration, neglecting dilution by other chemically-generated gases, is (0.104/20) ~ 0.0052 volume fraction, or 0.52%. Even with bounding conservative assumptions, the hydrogen concentration remained well below 1% during this event.
Per the conservative assumptions discussed above, scrap from MC02-181A generates hydrogen at a rate of 0.435 cc/minute/gram scrap dissolved, and scrap from MC02-201A generates hydrogen at a rate of 2.284 cc/minute/gram of scrap dissolved. The weighted average of the generation rate for scrap dissolved when the two cans are mixed is given below: Table 2 , the heat generation at the peak reaction rate is the sum of the heat generated to raise the temperature plus the heat generated to replace ambient losses. This is (2.85E+02+2.33E+02) ~5.18E+02 Kcal/minute. The rate of aluminum dissolution that produces this amount of heat is ((5.18E+02/7.28) ~ 71.2 grams of aluminum per minute. The aluminum is assumed to be about 52% of the total for both cans, so (71.2/0.52) ~ 137 grams of scrap are assumed to be dissolved per minute. This will produce (137*0.775) 1 06.2 cc of hydrogen per minute.
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It is conservatively assumed the volume increases 5% due to bubble retention during the maximum gas generation rate (Reference 6). It is also assumed that a "mound" of liquid and gas underneath the charge chute occupies about 1.5 liters of the gas space volume. This reduces the dissolver gas space to about 11 liters volume. If liquid is expelled during "burps," the vapor space increases.
From gas flow rates, the duration of a "burp" is expected to be five seconds or less. The hydrogen concentration is evaluated for a very conservative "burp" duration of 25 seconds, five times the expected value.
In 25 seconds, 44.2 cc of hydrogen is expelled into 11,000 cc of vapor space. The hydrogen concentration in the vapor space, with 20 cfm purge flow, is very low. If there is no purge flow for 25 seconds, the 44.2 cc of hydrogen is added to the 11,000 cc vapor space, resulting in a concentration of (44.2/11,000) ~ 4.0E-03 or 0.40 % hydrogen. This neglects potential temperature differences between the hydrogen and the vapor space but these would not cause the hydrogen concentration to exceed 1%. Therefore, even with a very conservative flow interruption time, and conservatively neglecting the dilution by other chemically-generated gases, the hydrogen concentration stays well below 1% during the event.
The purge flow rate is 20 CFM at one atmosphere and 72 °F. Conservatively assuming the vapor space is at the same conditions, a 14-liter vapor space will be replaced seven times in about 11 seconds. This will dilute any hydrogen in the vapor space by a factor of about 1000, or to a negligible concentration. Therefore, an 11-second duration between burps is sufficient to reduce any accumulated hydrogen to negligible concentrations.
This conservative analysis shows that the hydrogen concentration in the dissolver was maintained at or below 1% by volume during the event. In addition, it is recognized that the LFL is reduced with increasing temperature. At ambient conditions, the LFL for hydrogen in air is 4 volume %. This value is reduced as temperature is increased.
In this case, the large purge rate serves to limit the temperature rise in the dissolver vapor space, minimizing the decrease in the LFL. The analysis presented above shows that a maximum concentration of 0.52 volume percent hydrogen could have occurred in the dissolver. The minimum LFL that would be protected during the event would be four times the maximum hydrogen concentration (since HB-Line is required to control to 25% of LFL and 1/0.25 = 4). This results in a minimum LFL of 2.08 volume percent.
The LFL would have to be reduced to 2.08 volume percent for HB-Line to have violated the 25% of LFL requirement. The magnitude of this shift is not possible given the temperatures associated with Phase I operations. Therefore, no violation of the 25% of LFL requirement occurred during the event.
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In the event of a loss of purge, HB-Line would still have maintained hydrogen below 25% of the LFL. The mechanism by which purge flow would have been lost in this event would require a gas flow rate that was larger than was calculated in Section 3.3. The total flow rate of gasses would have to be greater than the 7 cfm of gasses calculated in Section 3.3. The hydrogen production rate from the first charge would remain unchanged because the increased gas generation rate would have produced nitrogen oxides. Section 3.5 calculates that 0.104 cfm of hydrogen conservatively represents the hydrogen generated from the combination of cans MC02-181A and MC02-201A. This would result in a hydrogen concentration in the generated gasses of (0.104/7) 1.5 volume percent. Since much more nitrogen oxides gas would have been produced, the concentration of hydrogen would be less than 25% of the LFL as required by the HBLine Safety Basis.
Description of Potential Mechanism That Discharges Liquid/Gas Through the Charge Chute
One mechanism was proposed that could explain an eruction of a liquid/vapor mixture through the charge chute. Such a mechanism has the potential to block the charge chute for brief periods of time. The analysis has shown that even during brief losses of purge, HB-Line maintained hydrogen concentration below 1% by volume. The following provides a description of how such a mechanism may have occurred in HB-Line, describe the potential behavior of the eruction, and propose how such this mechanism may be prevented in the future.
Reference 2 shows the dissolver dimensions. The dissolver contained about 16 liters of 12M nitric acid. The liquid height in the dissolver was about 9 inches, and the liquid height was about 7 inches below the top of the dissolver at ambient conditions. The charge chute is 3-inch schedule 40 pipe and the vessel vent system connection is 2-inch schedule 40 pipe.
Up to 7 cfm of non-condensable gas can be produced at peak reaction conditions. Per the previous analyses on heat losses, the maximum reaction rate occurs when the reaction first reaches the highest temperatures. If this postulated mechanism were correct, it would be more likely to occur at times of peak gas generation rates, rather than during the heatup.
A two-phase flow expert was consulted (Reference 6). The opinion was that entrainment of the gas generated in the bulk liquid was unlikely if the reaction were occurring throughout the bulk of the liquid. A volume increase of about 5% was stated to be bounding, based on judgment. However, the expert felt there was a potential mechanism for carrying a liquid-air mixture up the charge chute. If the mixer did not rapidly disperse the scrap when poured in, and most of the scrap settled to the side of the dissolver under the charge chute, enough gas could be generated locally to cause a vertical "mound" of gas-water mixture above the bulk liquid level. The gas velocity could be sufficient to
WSRC-TR-2003-00242 Analysis of Events Associated With Revision 1 First Charge of Desicooler Material
Page 18 of 44 carry some material from the top of the liquid-gas "mound" into the charge chute and expel this mixture from the charge chute. The upflow of liquid below the charge chute from the agitator in the dissolver enhances the chances of forming a "mound." This could temporarily block the charge chute when the gas-liquid mixture "burped" from the top of the charge chute. This process can repeat as often as long sufficient gas is released. Gas and liquid would rapidly separate once the mixture cleared the top of the charge chute. Hot yellowish-colored nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) fumes would rise into the glovebox from the separated mixture.
This mechanism would block the charge chute while the column of liquid-gas mixture was being expelled. The charge chute clears once the liquid-gas column is expelled. The flow rate of gas to suspend the gas-liquid column is about one foot/second or greater, and the charge chute is about 1.5 feet in length, so gas would travel the length of the column in about 1.5 seconds. The liquid velocity in the mixture would travel slower, but the time of blockage would probably be less than five seconds.
This mechanism could explain the presence of colored gas in the glovebox during heatup and the presence of liquid around the dissolver charge chute after the event was over. This mechanism does not explain the response of the pressure instrumentation that shows long periods of positive pressure in the dissolver. This is discussed in Section 3.2 of this report.
Per Reference 6, this phenomenon can be avoided by charging smaller portions of aluminum. The gas generation rate would be smaller since there is less aluminum to react with the acid and create gas bubbles.
Analysis of the Appropriateness of LCO 3.3.2A Condition B with Exothermic Reactions
The HB-Line Safety Basis requires control of hydrogen to 1% by volume. The analysis presented has shown that HB-Line did not exceed this limit. The LCO control requires that the heater block be turned off and material stop being added to the dissolver when an upset in purge occurs. Given the highly exothermic nature of the reaction without additional heat input has called into question the adequacy of this response. The following analysis will show that the action required by the LCO is appropriate and prove that the Safety Basis controls protect against the hydrogen hazard.
The Safety Basis controls in place for H2 generation are two fold. The first is TSR Administrative Control 6.4.17.4A and the other is the JCO actions (3.3.2.A) that require turning off the heater block if air purge is lost to the dissolver. Each will be discussed.
Administrative control 6.4.17.4A is in place to limit the amount of material to ensure the facility does not exceed H 2 concentration of 25% of the LFL during dissolution in normal operations. Administrative Control 6.4.17.4 states "Controls shall be in place to prevent dissolution of Mixed Scrap material whose hydrogen generation rate could challenge the
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Page 19 of 44 capability of the dissolver hydrogen dilution and removal controls to perform their safety functions." It further states "Before Mixed Scrap material can be processed, engineering shall evaluate its hydrogen capability." The engineering evaluation shall specify limits on the amount of material that can be charged in a dissolver batch. The information for developing H 2 calculations is derived from analytical lab analysis and statistical analysis of the material being charged. The Administrative Control further states that "The processing of any Mixed Scrap material whose hydrogen generation rate (radiolytic and chemical) could challenge the capability of the Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System and dissolver vacuum instrumentation to maintain a hydrogen concentration less than or equal to 25% LFL in the dissolver vapor space, or whose chemical hydrogen rate could cause the hydrogen concentration in the dissolver vapor space to exceed the LFL if the Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System and/or dissolver vacuum instrumentation became inoperable and compensatory controls were not established, shall not be permitted." This requirement applies to all factors (radiolytic and chemical) that could cause hydrogen generation, including the heat of reaction and its contribution to the hydrogen gas evolved.
The IMMEDIATE ACTION to turn the heater block off associated with LCO 3.3.2.A, is concerned with slowing down the chemically generated hydrogen into the dissolver vapor space if the heater is on. Once heatup of the process begins, using the heater, a calculated amount of H 2 will be produced based on the above calculations (in the Administrative Control). Therefore, the total amount of H 2 is calculated prior to each charge. If the total H 2 generation is limited by charge size then the action to turn off the heater block is proper for conditions affecting the air purge.
Safety Basis Requirements Applicable to Event
All Safety Basis requirements applicable to this event are listed below. This includes controls from the: SAR, JCO for Alternate Hydrogen Control, TSR, and Double Contingency Analysis (DCA) controls. HB-Line Safety Basis compliance is discussed below each control. This AC requires an engineering evaluation to ensure that the hydrogen concentration can be maintained less than or equal to 25% of LFL with a flow rate through the dissolver charge chute of 20 cfm during normal operations. It shall ensure that the hydrogen concentration can be maintained at less than LFL with a flow rate of 6.6 cfm through the dissolver charge chute during abnormal operations (inoperable Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System).
SAR (WSRC-
Compliance: An engineering evaluation as described above was performed for all material charged to the dissolver during this event. This evaluation was based on a laboratory analysis of the hydrogen generation properties of the Desicooler material. The hydrogen calculation also serves as the vehicle for complying with a SAR commitment to analyze the CEDE of the material and supplements the administrative control for preventing an uncontrolled reaction. The requirements of these controls are listed separately in the sections related to the SAR and TSR. The hydrogen controls outlined in the evaluation were not violated during the event.
Design Feature A.1.3A Process Vessels
The design feature replaces Design Feature A.1.3 of the HB-Line TSR. The only change made was to remove the credit taken for a hole in the dissolver charge chute cover. Under TSR purge controls, this hole provides the path for purge air through the dissolvers. Under the JCO purge controls, the charge chute cover is removed so the hole becomes the entire charge chute. The requirements to assure that the hole retains its function are covered in LCO 3.3.2A. The charge chute cover is prevented from being restored by LCO 3.3.2A. Since entry into LCO 3.3.2A was not required, the design feature was intact during the event. The Building Backup Power System shall be OPERABLE
TSR (WSRC-TS

Compliance:
The Building Backup Power System was OPERABLE during the event.
All Surveillance Requirements associated with the LCO were current at the time of the event and did not impact the event.
AC 6.4.17.1: This AC requires that process controls to prevent an uncontrolled reaction in a Phase I dissolver. Controls shall be in place to prevent the processing of quantities of metals incompatible with nitric acid dissolution that could cause an uncontrolled reaction. Compliance: An uncontrolled reaction is controlled primarily by engineering evaluation. The evaluation for hydrogen required by AC 6.4.14.4A also analyzes the reactivity potential of the material to be processed. In addition, all material is passed through a #10 mesh screen prior to charging in a Phase I dissolver.
Design Feature A.1.6 Vessel Vent System Piping
The VVS piping serves as an SS component to prevent the hydrogen deflagration. The system piping provides a vent path to the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System for sweeping hydrogen from the vessels.
During the event, no deflagration or detonation occurred. No other accident or event occurred which could prevent the VVS piping from serving the function of providing a vent path to the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System.
Design Feature A.1.13 Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System Ductwork
The Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System ductwork serves as a SS component to prevent hydrogen deflagration. The ductwork provides a continuous flow path for purge air to be drawn through the process vessels to the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System.
During the event, no deflagration or detonation occurred. No other accident or event occurred which could prevent the Scrap Recovery Glovebox Exhaust System Ductwork from serving the function of providing a vent path to the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System.
Double Contingency Analysis (N-NCS-H-00120, Rev. 7)
There are no credible criticality scenarios for the Scrap Recovery dissolvers.
The CSL for full water reflected, dry plutonium oxide is 9 kg of Pu-239. HB-Line procedurally limits dissolver runs to less than 1.5 kg Pu-239 equivalent. HB-Line screens all material prior to charging to ensure that no fissile metal is charged to the dissolver. The dissolver charge was less than 1.5 kg Pu-239 equivalent. Since these requirements were met, no violation of DCA controls occurred during the event.
Other Scrap Recovery Controls
Scrap Recovery controls also include requirements on the handling of material, movement of the dissolved material to the Product Hold Tanks (PHT's), and the transferring of dissolved material to H-Canyon for further disposition. Among these controls are LCO 3.3.1 for Process Air compressors, LCO 3.3.3 for Process Air Purge in PHT's and filtrate tank, and LCO 3.5.2 for Nuclear Safety Interlocks on the PHT's. Scrap Recovery also contains additional criticality controls. None of these additional controls are applicable to the dissolvers.
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All controls applicable to the event have been identified above along with an explanation of how HB-Line maintained compliance through the event. Since compliance with all requirements was maintained, no Safety Basis violation occurred.
ISMS Review
The technical analysis presented in Section 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 concludes that no Safety Basis violations occurred and that no PISA exists for this event. The technical analysis verifies that hydrogen generation did not exceed 1% of LFL in the dissolver vapor space nor were dissolver purge requirements violated.
Applying the principles of the ISMS, it is recognized that WSRC failed to implement adequate process controls to limit the rate of exothermic reaction in RD-13. The rate of the aluminum reaction was not adequately forecasted. Lab characterization results indicated the material had significant amounts of aluminum, which should have resulted in more restrictive operating controls to limit the rate of material addition to the dissolver to account for aluminum generated exothermic reactions. The laboratory analysis adds acid to scrap versus the scrap to acid addition in HB-Line. The addition of acid to scrap in the lab disperses the scrap at the bottom of the laboratory dissolver. This emulates the effects of the HB-Line agitator.
Future charges of scrap will be more thoroughly controlled to ensure the rate of addition is not going to produce exothermic reactions beyond expected values. For the remaining desicooler material the rate of addition will be controlled to ensure total heat generated from the scrap will not exceed a predetermined total temperature rise in the liquid. The implementation for the new restrictions is going to be controlled through technical engineering evaluations consistent with current administrative TSR/JCO controls and facility procedures.
Analysis of Adequacy of the Safety Basis
During the Desicooler event, the Safety Basis succeeded in controlling the hazards. The controls ensured that the hydrogen concentration in the dissolver vapor space did not exceed 25% of the LFL as shown above. The Safety Basis Hazard Analysis considered hazards of this type in Reference 11 (Event Number SR-14) and determined them to be Hazard Category III and not require controls in the Safety Basis. Based on this, the HBLine Safety Basis is deemed adequate to prevent the hazards associated with this event.
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Conclusions
Analysis of the Desicooler event with respect to Safety Basis requirements has shown that no Safety Basis violation occurred during the Desicooler event. Applying the principles of the ISMS, it is recognized that WSRC failed to implement adequate process controls to limit the rate of exothermic reaction in RD-13. This is not a Safety Basis issue and will be addressed through the ISMS process.
The conservative analysis of the available information shows that the hydrogen concentration during the event did not exceed 25% of the LFL. The purge rate of 20 CFM was maintained except for possible brief periods where liquid-gas mixture was possibly being expelled through the charge chute. Even during these brief periods, the hydrogen concentration did not exceed 25% of the LFL. All other Safety Basis controls were maintained and no Safety Basis violation occurred. The Safety Basis successfully controlled hydrogen to below 25% of LFL. The Safety Basis controls successfully prevented an uncontrolled chemical reaction and this type of event was analyzed in the Hazards Analysis. Based on these results, a PISA does not exist and the Safety Basis protects the worker, the facility and the public. 
Appendix F: Heat Loss Equations and Results
The following equations were used to determine the heat loss expected from the dissolver to the environment: This chart shows the effects of the RD-14 charge chute being obstructed and the corresponding change in RD-13 as seen by the pressure instrumentation
